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Abstract 
    This paper analyzes the effects of firing costs in a broader setup than what is usually done, 
allowing for on-the-job training. By doing so the traditional analysis is extended with respect 
to two points: On the one hand firing costs clearly increase firm training because worker 
and firm are less likely to separate. 
    On the other hand, firm training gives firms the opportunity to lower the costs of firing 
restrictions: After all the value of output of a well-trained worker is less likely to turn 
negative. Through these two channels firm training is able to diminish the negative effects of 
firing restrictions usually discussed in the literature. 
Keywords 
Firm Training, Firing Costs, Human Capital 
JEL Classification 
E24, J24, J63, J68, M53 1 Introduction
Quite often labor market institutions are held responsible for the relatively high unemploy-
ment rates in continental Europe. These institutions - union wage-setting, minimum-wage
laws, employment protection and high labor taxes to name but a few - are claimed to
create rigid labor markets, which are not able to cope with the needs of a constantly
changing economic environment and technological progress - especially when compared
to the ﬂexible labor markets of the United States.
We concentrate on one of these institutions - namely ﬁring costs - and show in a two-
period overlapping-generations model with search-frictions and ﬁrm-training that there
a r es o m ep o s i t i v ee ﬀects as well. As Acemoglu (1997) has shown, a ﬁrm will underinvest
in its workers’ training if there is a positive probability that the worker will leave the ﬁrm,
because it does not take into account the higher productivity of the worker in her next
job.
We demonstrate that ﬁring costs can alleviate this ineﬃciency because the probability
of separations is decreased. Foreseeing this, the ﬁrm invests more in training because it
beneﬁts more often. Of course, this comes at the cost of ineﬃcient separations - in some
cases the ﬁrm may keep the worker even if, for society, a separation would be the better
alternative.
Concerning unemployment two eﬀects have to be distinguished. First, as already
mentioned, ﬁring costs lead to fewer separations which unambiguously reduces the un-
employment rate. Secondly, at the same time they impose a restriction on ﬁrms, thereby
decreasing their value - some ﬁrms drop out of the market and for unemployed workers it
becomes harder to ﬁnd a new job. Analytically, it is not clear which of these two eﬀects
dominates but numerical simulations suggest that an increase in unemployment is more
likely if not necessary. These two channels are well known in the literature.1 However, the
novelty of this paper is that it modiﬁes the working of these channels by allowing ﬁrms to
1See further below.
1invest in their workers’ human capital. By training workers the ﬁrm can reduce the risk
of having to ﬁre a worker since the value of output of well-trained workers is less likely to
turn negative. Thus the possibility of ﬁrm training lowers the costs of ﬁring restrictions
and therefore the decrease in workers’ job ﬁnding rates is not that severe.
This paper builds on two diﬀerent branches of the literature. The ﬁrst focuses on ﬁrms’
training investments and workers’ mobility and the second on ﬁring costs and unemploy-
ment. To my knowledge there is only one other paper trying to combine both aspects
(Belot et al. (2002)), however natural it seems when evaluating a policy instrument.
Empirical results concerning the relationship between ﬁring costs and unemployment
are rather mixed. For instance, Nickell (1998) and Bertola (1992) do not ﬁnd a negative
relationship whereas Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov et al. (1998) do. This lack of un-
ambiguity could be explained by theoretical models predicting a non-linear relationship
between ﬁring costs and unemployment (such as Belot et al. (2002) or this work).
Supporting our results is a study by Layard and Nickell (1999) who show in a cross-
country regression that productivity growth and employment protection are positively
correlated.
There exists ample evidence on the positive relationship between on-the-job-training
and the duration of jobs (see for instance Lynch(1991), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999)
or Parent (1999)). However, this kind of literature mainly focuses on the eﬀect of training
and turnover and not vice versa. Since ﬁrms proﬁt from the enhanced productivity of
their workers, they are more reluctant to ﬁre well-trained workers. Direct evidence on
the relationship between ﬁring costs and training investments is virtually non-existent
although — as Adnett et al. (2001) mention - there can be found some reassuring examples
in non-traditional labor markets such as sports or armed forces. In addition, Adnett et
al. argue that some indirect evidence on the subject can be derived by analyzing the
portability of pension plans, which might impose a mobility restriction on workers. In
fact, Dorsey and MacPhearson (1997) ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between
pension coverage and training.
2On the theoretical front Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002) try to cope with the
problem that during the 1960s unemployment in Europe was lower than in the U.S.
While this relationship has reversed during the last two decades, one cannot say that
labor market institutions in Europe have been built up dramatically — rather the opposite
is true. Ljungqvist and Sargent argue that the way these institutions aﬀect unemployment
depends crucially on the degree of economic turbulence. They build a model in which
workers accumulate knowledge when working (learning by doing), but loose human capital
when unemployed. Economic turbulence is modelled by a parameter determining how
much of her human capital a worker looses after she is ﬁred. Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2002) show that ﬁring taxes (paid by the workers) might decrease the unemployment
rate during tranquil times by lowering the number of quits. However, when turbulence
increases — as for instance Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994) have shown to be the case for
the last two decades — this relationship will reverse. Workers now search with less eﬀort
because the ﬁring tax decreases the value of a job. In their model this unambiguously
depresses overall welfare.
Compared to our paper there is one major diﬀerence: In the papers by Ljungqvist and
Sargent human capital accumulates as a by-product of working, so there is no investment-
decision and thus a positive eﬀect of ﬁring costs on human capital is inherently excluded.
In contrast, our model allows agents to choose the amount of training themselves and
therefore ﬁring costs have a diﬀerent impact on the level of human capital. Nonetheless,
our model is able to duplicate their result that ﬁring costs are doing more harm during
economically turbulent times.
Most closely related to our model is the work of Belot et al. (2002). They as well use
a matching model and show that ﬁring costs could potentially increase overall welfare.
However, in their model ineﬃciencies stem from two other channels than in our model.
The ﬁrst are distorting taxes and the second is a hold-up problem. The worker has to
ﬁnance her training on her own and wages are negotiated after these costs have been sunk
—k n o w i n gt h a tt h eﬁrm is able to reap some of the proﬁts the worker underinvests. Here
3ﬁring costs work as a commitment device of the employer and the worker reacts with
higher investments.
In turn, our model does not need to rely on the ineﬃciencies created by distorting
taxes or on the hold-up problem. Ineﬃciencies stem from the fact that the training ﬁrm
does not take into account that its ﬁred workers are more productive in their following
employment-relationships as well - this kind of ineﬃciency is very well conﬁrmed by the
empirical literature (see for instance Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998 and 1999). But the
main advantage of our model is that Belot et al. cannot explain satisfactorily why the
ﬁrm and the worker do not agree on a ﬁring-fee on their own, although both parties would
gain from such an agreement. In contrast, a ﬁrm in our model is hurt unambiguously by
the ﬁring cost and thus would never agree on it. This paper concentrates on the positive
eﬀects of ﬁring costs. However, a former version did as well a welfare-analysis and could
be provided by the author.
Adnett et al. (2001) and Booth and Chatterji (1989) follow a similar approach by
theoretically examining the relationship between ﬁring costs and training investments
but they do not consider unemployment at all.
In Adnett et al. (2001) a worker is hit by two separate productivity-shocks — one
aﬀecting her productivity with her current employer and one aﬀecting her productivity
outside of the ﬁrm — which are totally independent of each other. In this model it might
be the case that the outside option of the ﬁrm is so good that it never trains its workers
— ﬁring costs can change this situation by lowering the value of this outside option.
Booth and Chatterji (1989) have a diﬀerent claim: They want to explain why redun-
dancy payments diﬀer so much between ﬁrms and industries in Britain. They assume that
the costs of training are shared between worker and ﬁrm. For the worker to accept this
she needs to be compensated in case of a layoﬀ. The value of this redundancy payment is
negotiated between worker and ﬁrm and depends on the variance of a productivity-shock.
We will proceed as follows. The next section gives a non-technical description of
the model, while the formal model is presented in section three. Section four illustrates
4the solution of the model, whereas the impact of ﬁring costs is discussed in section ﬁve.
Finally, some numerical results follow in Section six. Section seven provides a conclusion.
2 General description
We consider a discrete-time overlapping generations (OLG) model. Production takes place
in worker-ﬁrm pairs; no capital is needed. Firms are inﬁnitely lived. Workers live for two
periods (young and old). The productivity of young workers is given exogenously and is
equal for all workers, but they can be trained on the job to increase their productivity for
the second period.
At the beginning of each period a number of individuals n is born and immediately
engages in job-search. With probability Pfind -w h i c hi ss p e c i ﬁed further below - a young
worker ﬁnds a job and with probability (1 − Pfind) she remains unemployed for the
whole period. In this case she can apply again for a job at the beginning of her sec-
ond period. Since we are not interested in endogenizing search-intensity, we can disregard
unemployment-beneﬁts. If a young worker’s search is successful, she will be trained on
the job, with the ﬁrm bearing the cost. Training is assumed to be general, which means
that the resulting stock of human capital can be used in every other ﬁrm without any
restrictions. In other words, the productivity increase of the worker is the same regardless
of the ﬁrm that trained her. This is in contrast to speciﬁc training which will increase
the output of the worker only if she stays with the training ﬁrm.2 Wages are determined
via Nash-bargaining before the investment-decision has taken place.3
At the end of the ﬁrst period the worker-ﬁrm pair is hit by a randomly distributed, ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity shock, which could potentially turn the proﬁts of the ﬁrm negative.
In that case the ﬁrm would like to ﬁr et h ew o r k e r ,b u tt h a tw i l lc o s ta ne x o g e n o u s l y
2General training is the more interesting case because, according to Becker (1962), ﬁrms should not
invest in general training at all.
3Letting negotiations take place after the investment-decision would only complicate the analysis but
does not qualitatively change the results.
5determined ﬁring cost F, which takes the form of administrative costs and therefore is
completely lost. A worker who was ﬁred cannot immediately be rehired by another ﬁrm
in the same period. Consequently, the worker engages in job-search at the beginning of
her second period, but with the prospect of higher earnings (compared to a worker who
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Thus, ex-post at the beginning of each period there are four diﬀerent groups of workers,
although ex-ante workers are homogenous (in brackets ﬁnd the notation for the value of
each type of worker) : 4
• Young workers who are always born unemployed and untrained (Uy);
• old workers who did not ﬁnd a job when young and therefore are still unemployed
and untrained at the beginning of their second period (Uu);
• old workers who were employed when young but were ﬁred due to a bad shock -
they are trained and unemployed (Uf);
4There could be more groups distinguished if we look at the middle of a period, but since job-search
takes place at the beginning of each period this is the relevant dimension.
6• and ﬁnally old workers who remained in their initial jobs (Wo).
We will keep this notation for the remainder of the paper: The letter U denotes the
value of an unemployed worker, whereas the letter W is used for workers with a job. For
the ﬁrms we use V for a vacancy and J for a ﬁlled job. The subscript y stands for young
workers and u, f and o for old workers who were unemployed, who were ﬁred and who
retained their jobs, respectively. These subscripts are also used for the ﬁrms to denote
t h et y p eo fw o r k e rt h a tc u r r e n t l yﬁlls a position.
Figure (1) illustrates graphically the possible life-time careers of the typical worker















period 1 period 2 
Following the above classiﬁcation, at any time there are three diﬀerent types of workers
available on the job-market.5 We assume that the ﬁrm cannot direct its search towards
one of these groups and therefore never knows which worker it will get. The probability
of drawing a certain type of worker depends on the share of this type in the entire pool
of unemployed workers. Depending on the type of worker a ﬁrm ﬁnally hires (if any), we
can distinguish ﬁve diﬀerent states for ﬁrms:
• A vacancy (V );
• aj o bﬁlled by a young worker (Jy);
• aj o bﬁlled by an old worker who was trained within the same ﬁrm (Jo);
5We do not consider on the job search.
7• aj o bﬁlled by an old worker who was unemployed when young (Ju);
• aj o bﬁlled by an old worker who was ﬁr e da tt h ee n do fh e rﬁrst period and received
training from another ﬁrm (Jf).
3 The model
3.1 Value-functions
In this section we derive the Bellman equations for the diﬀerent states of ﬁrms and the
types of workers described above. The notation is very much in line with Pissarides
(2000).
3.1.1 Firms
The value of a vacancy consists of the ﬁrms’ prospects of ﬁnding a worker of the three
diﬀerent types. This value is diminished by the search-costs, which have to be paid for
every period of active search:6
V (θ,g,ge)=−sc + PyoungJy + PfiredJf + PunempJu (1)
+[1− Pyoung − Pfired− Punemp]ρV
The arguments of the value-function for a vacancy are the tightness of the labor market
θ, the amount of human-capital investments the ﬁrm would undertake in the case that it
ﬁnds a young worker g and the investments of other ﬁrms ge, sc are the exogenous and
constant search-costs, Pyoung, Pfired and Punemp are the probabilities of ﬁnding a young
worker, an old worker who was ﬁred or an old worker who was unemployed, respectively.
6To keep the notation simple we omit the arguments of value functions when they are used inside any
other function.
8In these cases the ﬁrm earns the corresponding value Jy, Jf or Ju. If search was not
successful, the ﬁrm will keep the value of the vacancy V . Of course, this value has to
be discounted for one period by the discount factor ρ =1 /(1 + r). The probabilities are
exogenous to the ﬁrm (although endogenous to the model )a n da r et r e a t e di nm o r ed e t a i l
further below.
For a ﬁrm the value of a young worker consists of the current proﬁta n dt h ed i s c o u n t e d
value of the following period. This value can either be the value of an old worker who was
t r a i n e di nt h eﬁrm (if the worker stays) or the value of a vacancy minus the ﬁring costs
in case of a negative shock leading to a separation - both values are weighted with their
probabilities:
Jy(g)=vy − wy − c(g)+PstayρE (Jo)+[ 1− Pstay]ρ(V − F) (2)
where vy is the value of production and wy is the wage of a young worker, c(g) are
the costs of human capital investments, which are assumed to increase at a rising rate,
i.e. c0(g) > 0, c00(g) > 0 and Pstay is the probability that the worker will stay in the ﬁrm.
Since the value of the shock is not known at this point in time, the exact value of an
old worker (Jo)i su n k n o w na sw e l la n dw eh a v et ou s ea ne x p e c t a t i o n s - o p e r a t o r . T h i s






where d(λ) is the density-function of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shock λ and λ is
the reservation-productivity: For any shock below this threshold the worker will be ﬁred.
A more detailed deﬁnition follows further below.
O n c et h es h o c ki sk n o w n ,t h ev a l u eo ft h ew o r k e ri sd e t e r m i n e da s :
Jo(g,λ)=vo (g,λ) − wo (g,λ)+ρV (4)
9By assumption, the worker-ﬁrm pair will split with certainty after this period and the
ﬁrm retains the value of a vacancy. The value of human capital g is (or better, was) in
control of the ﬁrm.7
The values of old workers, who were unemployed when young or who were ﬁred are,
respectively:
Ju = vu − wu + ρV (5)
Jf(ge)=vf (ge) − wf (ge)+ρV (6)
where in the second equation ge replaces g to indicate that the human capital of ﬁred
workers is not in the control of the actual ﬁrm since she was trained by some other ﬁrm.8
Both values are independent of λ since the shock is speciﬁct ot h eﬁrm in which the
worker was trained, so vo (g,λ) in equation (4) is the only productivity that is dependent
on the shock and it is also the only productivity that is dependent on the ﬁrm’s own
human-capital investments.
3.1.2 Workers
The value-functions for the unemployed workers are:9
Uy = PfindWy +[ 1− Pfind]ρUu (7)
Uu = Pfindwu (8)
7Of course the ﬁrm cannot control for g after the shock has become known but at the beginning of
period one.
8A ﬁrm’s probability of matching again with a worker who was trained in the same ﬁrm is assumed
to be zero.
9The value functions for old workers are just equal to their wages: Wu = wu, Wo = wo, Wf = wf.
10Uf(ge)=Pfindwf (ge) (9)
With probability Pfind a young unemployed person will ﬁnd a job that is of worth Wy.
If she is not matched with a ﬁrm she will stay unemployed for the whole period and can
search again at the beginning of the second period, when she will be old and untrained
(Uu). The values for the other two types of unemployed workers are straight-forward: She
gets a job and thereby a wage or she dies without any further earnings.
Since the ﬁrms cannot direct their search, the hazard-rates of ﬁnding a job are the
same for all unemployed, irrespective of their employment history, i.e. an old, untrained
worker has the same chances of ﬁnding a new job as a young worker.
It remains to determine the value of a young worker who had the good fortune to ﬁnd
a job immediately. Her value function is:
Wy(g)=wy + PstayρE(wo(g,λ)) + [1 − Pstay]ρUf (10)
She earns a wage wy and has a positive probability of keeping the job (Pstay), in which
case she will earn the uncertain wage of an old worker wo (g,λ) (uncertain because it
depends on the shock λ). If she experiences a bad shock, she will lose her job but have
the chance to ﬁnd another job in period two (Uf). One should keep in mind that Uf is
also dependent on g, although the argument has been omitted.
3.1.3 Free-entry condition
We assume free entry of ﬁrms, so that new ﬁr m sw i l le n t e rt h em a r k e ta sl o n ga sp r o ﬁts
are possible - this drives down the value of a vacancy (through increasing the tightness of
the labor market and thereby lowering the ﬁrms’ probability of ﬁnding a worker) until it
is zero. If V were larger than zero, ﬁrms would make positive proﬁts on average and this
11would attract new ﬁrms to the market. The probability of ﬁrms ﬁnding a worker would
go down and with it the proﬁts of ﬁrms, until V reached zero. Only then are there no
incentives for further entries. The reverse would happen if V were negative: Some ﬁrms
drop out of the market, improving the probability of the remaining ﬁrms ﬁn d i n gaw o r k e r .
Thus, the free-entry condition or zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o ni s :
V (θ,g,ge)=0 (11)
3.2 Wages
Wages are determined via Nash-bargaining.10 Let β denote the bargaining power of
workers. Then for instance the wage of a worker who was unemployed when young but
who found a job in her second period is the solution of the Nash-maximand: 11
wu = Arg max(Wu − dead)β(Ju − V )(1−β) = Arg maxWu
βJu
(1−β)
i.e. the wage maximizes the product of the surpluses of both parties, weighted by their
respective bargaining-powers. This yields:
Wu − dead = β(Wu − dead + Ju − V ) (12)
T h ew o r k e r ’ sg a i nf r o mt h em a t c hi sj u s tas h a r eβ of the joint value, whereas the ﬁrm
keeps a share of (1 − β). By plugging in these values12 into equation (12) we arrive at:
10See for instance Shaked and Sutton (1984) for a game-theoretic foundation of Nash-bargaining or
Pissarides (2000) for an application to the matching framework.
11The values dead and V are the threatpoints of the worker resp. the ﬁrm. Thus, it is implicitly
assumed - as is common in the literature - that the worker and the ﬁrm cannot return to the labor
market in the same period if negotiations brake down.
12Wu is just equal to wu while Ju is given by equation (5).
12wu = βvu (13)
which is the wage of old workers who did not have a job when they were young.
By following the same procedure we get the wages for workers who were ﬁred and who
retained their ﬁrst-period jobs. The respective expressions are:
wf(ge)=βvf (ge) (14)
wo(g,λ)=β (vo (g,λ)+F) (15)
Again workers get a share β of the joint surplus, where the old worker, who is still
in the same ﬁrm, has the advantage that the ﬁrm’s threat-point is diminished by the
ﬁring cost F.13 This directly improves the bargaining position of the worker because both
parties know that it is costly for the ﬁrm to get rid of the worker.
For young workers things are a bit more complicated, since they will live for another




y = β [vy − c(g)+PstayρE(Jo)+[ 1− Pstay]ρ(V − F)] (16)







13Note that the ﬁring-cost has to be paid only if an old worker who was trained in the same ﬁrm is
ﬁred. We assume that F does not have to be paid only because wage-negotiations have started - therefore,
F does not enter the wages of formerly unemployed and ﬁred workers.
13This seemingly complicated equation can be interpreted as follows. A young worker
gets a share - according to her bargaining-power β -o ft h eﬁrm’s expected value of the
match (in the ﬁrst square-brackets of the equation), which consists of the current value of
production (ﬁrst term) and the expectation of the future-value (second and third term).
In turn, the ﬁrm gets a share - according to its own bargaining-power 1−β -o ft h ew o r k e r ’ s
expected gain from this match (inside the second square-brackets), which is the surplus
of the expected value of the match (ﬁrst and second term) over the alternative of staying
unemployed for her ﬁrst period. Thus, the wage bargaining in the ﬁrst period assures that
not only current proﬁts are shared according to bargaining powers but expected future
proﬁts as well.
3.3 Probabilities
In this section we derive the probability that a worker-ﬁrm pair will split after one pe-
riod. In addition we discuss the hazard-rates of ﬁrms and workers. For a more detailed
discussion of the matching framework see Pissarides (2000).
3.3.1 Job-ﬁnding-rates
As is standard we assume a concave, constant returns to scale matching function m =
m(nu,v), which gives the total number of matches per period as a function of the number
of all job-searchers nu and vacancies v. Because of the constant returns property we can








where θ = v
nu is a measure for the tightness of the labor market. Since q(θ)=
m(nu,v)
v
is the number of matches per vacancy, it gives directly the probability that a ﬁrm will
ﬁnd a worker. In turn, the probability that a worker will ﬁnd a vacancy is given by
m(nu,v)
nu = θq(θ) or
14Pfind(θ)=θq(θ) (19)
It is clear that an increase in θ implies a better chance for workers to ﬁnd a job but a
lower probability of ﬁrms ﬁnding a worker since the number of vacancies per unemployed
workers has increased.
S of a rw eh a v ed e t e r m i n e dt h ec h a n c e so faﬁrm ﬁnding any worker. To learn the
probabilities that the ﬁrm will ﬁnd a young or an old worker we need to know their
respective share in the pool of all unemployed. Since all the young are born unemployed,
their number is simply the rate at which young individuals are born: nuy = n.T h e
number of old workers who got ﬁr e di nt h e i rﬁrst job is given by nuf = nθq (θ)[1− Pstay].
The number of young workers who found a job last period is nθq (θ) and [1 − Pstay] is the
share of those workers who have lost their job. Finally, the number of old workers who
did not get a job when they were young is given by nuu = n(1−θq(θ)). The total number
of unemployed is the sum of these three groups:
nu = n + nθq (θ)[1− Pstay]+n(1 − θq(θ)) (20)
and their respective shares are e uy =
nuy
nu , e uf =
nuf
nu and e uu = nuu
nu .F i n a l l y , t h e
probability of the ﬁrm ﬁnding a worker of a certain type is simply given by the product
of the probability of ﬁnding any worker and the share of this type in the pool of all
unemployed:14
Pyoung (θ,ge)=q(θ)e uy (21)
Pfired(θ,ge)=q(θ)e uf (22)
14Since human capital has an inﬂuence on the separation probability, it also aﬀects the composition of
the unemployed-pool.
15Punemp (θ,ge)=q(θ)e uu (23)
3.3.2 Separations
As already mentioned above, at the end of the ﬁrst period the worker-ﬁrm-pair is hit by
an e g a t i v e ,ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock which reduces the output of period two. In the absence of
ﬁring costs it would be best for the ﬁrm to separate if the shock were so large that proﬁts
were negative — in this case the ﬁrm would not be willing to pay any positive wage and
both agree to split.
But if the ﬁrm has to pay some ﬁring costs it will be loss-minimizing to produce as
long as the running losses are not above this ﬁring cost. The worker, knowing this, is able
to bargain a positive wage and therefore prefers production as well.15 This eﬀect of ﬁring
costs on wages can be seen from equation (15) showing the wage of an old worker. Only if
the loss from production was larger than the ﬁring cost would there be no positive wages
and again both agree to separate. This reasoning leads to the following separation rule:
J0 < −F
vo (g,λ) − β (vo(g,λ)+F) < −F
(1 − β)(vo (g,λ)) − βF < −F
and ﬁnally:
vo(g,λ) < −F
This, in turn, results in the following deﬁnition of the reservation shock λ:







such that a shock worse (i.e. smaller) than λ causes a separation. Therefore, ex ante
the probability of staying together for two periods is
Pstay(g)=P(λ>λ)=1− D(λ) (25)
where D(λ) is the CDF of d(λ).
From a welfare point of view this decision is of course ineﬃcient — production takes
place even though the value of the product is less than the costs of producing it. However,
it must be noted that even in the absence of ﬁring costs separation-decisions need not be
eﬃcient, because it is possible that the worker will stay in the ﬁrm although she would be
more productive in another ﬁrm.16 This kind of ineﬃciency is due to our modelling of the
separation decision: If we relax assumptions by allowing workers to quit immediately after
they have learned the shock at the end of period one, then they would do so whenever
their expected earnings outside the ﬁrm are greater.17 Then separations would occur
eﬃciently, if ﬁring costs were zero.
But even in this case - as well as in the case where we do not allow workers to quit at the
end of period one - the introduction of ﬁring costs does add some extra-ineﬃciencies due
to the additional distortion of the separation decision. Since it is this kind of ineﬃciency
that’s relevant for our question we will stick to the simplifying assumption of not allowing
workers to quit at the end of period one.
16In the absence of ﬁring-costs separation takes place whenever vo (g,λ) < 0, but the value of an
alternative use of the worker is Pfindwf (g) > 0. So for a productivity between zero and Pfindwf (g) even
in the absence of ﬁring-costs there would be no separation although separation was eﬃcient.
17New separation-rule: vo (g,λ) <P findwf (g).
174 Solution of the model
The model has to be solved in the three unknowns: The labor market tightness θ and
the optimal investment-decisions g and ge. First we will discuss the optimal training
decision of the representative ﬁrm and the ineﬃciencies of that decision. In the symmetric
equilibrium all ﬁrms will provide the same amount of training. Finally, market tightness
is determined by the zero-proﬁt condition.
4.1 Investment-decision
After a ﬁrm has been matched with a young worker and the wage of the ﬁrst period has
been negotiated, the ﬁrm has the opportunity to invest in the worker’s human capital,
in the hope that she will stay with the ﬁrm. It chooses human capital investments to
maximize the value of having a young worker, which includes the value of an old, trained
worker:18
max
g Jy = vy − wy − c(g)+PstayρE(Jo)+[ 1− Pstay]ρ(V − F) (26)





∂g ρF + Pstayρ
∂E(Jo)
∂g
Since by deﬁnition the value of the ﬁrm is equal to the negative ﬁring cost at the
ﬁring-threshold (i.e. Jo = −F), the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side drop out.









18The young worker’s wage is marked by a bar to signal that it is already negotiated and ﬁxed.
18which is just a variation of the standard marginal cost equals marginal revenues rule.
O nt h el e f t - h a n ds i d ew es e et h em a r g i n a lc o s to ft r a i n i n ga n do nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d et h e
marginal returns which is the increase in the value of the ﬁrm (
∂E(Jo)
∂g ). This return has to
be discounted by the interest-rate and the risk of separation. The increase in ﬁrm value
is the increase in production multiplied by the bargaining power of the ﬁr ms i n c ep a r to f
the return is reaped by the worker through higher wages.
It might seem surprising that the change of the separation probability does not show
up in the optimality condition. After all, training makes the worker more productive
and thereby decreases the rate of separations and the likelihood that the ﬁrm has to
pay the ﬁring cost. However, at the threshold the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between ﬁring
and keeping the worker and therefore it does not gain anything from this change in
the separation-probability. This is the reason why the terms containing the change in
separation-probabilities cancel out.
It is obvious from equation (27) that training does not depend on the tightness of the
labor market. At ﬁrst sight this is very surprising: An increase in tightness improves the
chances of the worker on the labor market and thereby her bargaining-position. This is
reﬂe c t e di na ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew a g eo ft h eﬁrst period. However, as mentioned above it
is assumed that the worker cannot return to the labor market if negotiations break down
during the second period. This is the reason why the value of unemployment does not
show up in the wage of an old worker. Since the compression of the wage structure with
respect to old workers is relevant for the training decision (see equation (27)), market
tightness is irrelevant.











The ﬁrst term is negative by assumption. The third term will be non-positive if
productivity-gains from human capital are not increasing but the second term is deﬁ-
19nitely positive. Therefore, we have to assume that the progressiveness of training-costs is
suﬃciently large to assure that the second-order condition is satisﬁed.
So far we have discussed the solution for a representative ﬁrm. In the symmetric
equilibrium all ﬁrms are assumed to be identical. Of course, this implies that provided
training is identical for all ﬁr m sa sw e l l :
ge = g (29)
4.2 Ineﬃciencies
The investment-decision described above bears two diﬀerent kinds of ineﬃciencies which
is in line with the results of Acemoglu (see for instance Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu
and Pischke (1999)):
• Even though the worker bears part of the training-costs by accepting a lower ﬁrst-
period wage (see equation (16)), the ﬁrm decides privately about the magnitude of
training. Therefore, it takes into account only its own gains from higher productivity
and neglects the gains of the worker through higher second period wages. As a result
the ﬁrm underinvests in its worker’s human capital. This kind of ineﬃciency could
be eliminated if it were possible to sign contracts on the magnitude of training -
in this case the worker would be willing to accept even lower levels of ﬁrst-period
w a g e si nr e t u r nf o rm o r et r a i n i n ga n db o t hp a r t i e sw o u l db eb e t t e ro ﬀ. However, in
the training literature it is usually assumed that provided training is not observable
by others and therefore it is not possible to sign such contracts.19
• T h es e c o n dk i n do fi n e ﬃciency stems from the fact that the worker might be ﬁred.
In this case the training ﬁrm would no longer be able to participate in the worker’s
19See for instance Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).
20higher productivity. But since the worker has the chance to ﬁnd another employer,
this higher productivity would not be lost entirely. However, the training ﬁrm does
not take into account the higher output of the worker’s new employer. This kind
of ineﬃciency is even harder to come by than the ﬁr s to n e ,s i n c eac o n t r a c tw o u l d
need to include this future employer, whose identity cannot be known in advance.
4.3 Closing the model
Finally, the equilibrium of the labor market has to be determined. This is done by solving
the free-entry condition for market-tightness θ yielding the following equation:
−sc + PyoungJy + PfiredJf + PunempJu =0 (30)
If tightness is too high, ﬁrms will make losses on average and some will drop out of
t h em a r k e t-t h i sl o w e r st h en u m b e ro fv a c a n c i e sa n dt h e r e b yt h et i g h t n e s so ft h em a r k e t .
The probabilities to ﬁnd workers will increase until equation (30) is fulﬁlled. Whereas if
it is possible to make proﬁts on average, new ﬁrms will enter the market thereby lowering
the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy and depressing proﬁts.
Once the equilibrium-θ is determined, equation (20) gives the number of unemployed
at the beginning of each period. Since this is only an inﬁnitely small point in time,
the number of unemployed during a period is a better measure for unemployment. This
measure calculates as the product of the number of unemployed at the beginning of a
period and their probability of staying unemployed:
u = nu(1 − Pfind) (31)
Finally, the number of vacancies is given by:
v = θ · nu (32)
215 Firing costs
5.1 Eﬀect on human capital
The eﬀect of ﬁring costs can be found by taking the derivative of the right-hand side of

















which is larger than zero since ∂λ
∂F is negative. A larger (i.e. more negative) shock
is necessary to lead to a separation. In consequence, the marginal revenue of training-
investments increases and thus the worker is provided with more human capital. In
other words, ﬁring costs make dismissals more expensive and therefore the ﬁrm is more
reluctant to ﬁre a worker even when the output of the worker cannot cover its costs. On
the other hand the ﬁrm, anticipating that the worker is more likely to stay within the
ﬁrm, will invest more in human capital. Thus ﬁring costs have the potential to alleviate
the ineﬃciencies of the training decision discussed above.
5.2 Eﬀect on unemployment
Here we have to distinguish two possibly opposing eﬀects. To make things more clear
take equations (20) and (31) giving the rate of unemployment and rearrange to get:
u =( 1− Pfind)[2n − nPfindPstay]
22Not surprisingly, we see that an increase in the probability of not getting ﬁred (Pstay)
u n a m b i g u o u s l yd e c r e a s e st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e . S i n c ea ni n c r e a s eo fﬁring costs has
exactly this eﬀect (of increasing Pstay)t h e yt e n dt oi n c r e a s ee m p l o y m e n tt h r o u g ht h i s
channel.
B u tt h i si so n l yh a l fo ft h es t o r y .A tt h es a m et i m eﬁring costs inﬂuence the proﬁtability
of ﬁrms, thereby changing labor market tightness θ and the probability of workers ﬁnding
aj o b( Pfind). The relevant value-function to look at is the value of a vacancy V as given
by equation (1), since it is the zero-proﬁt condition which determines the equilibrium-
θ. In turn, the value-function of V contains three other value-functions. Two of these
depend on the level of ﬁring costs: The value of a young worker (Jy)a n dt h ev a l u eo fa
ﬁred worker (Jf).
As was proven in the section on training investments, ﬁring costs increase the human-
capital of old workers. It follows that Jf rises unambiguously (see equation (6)), since a
ﬁrm with an old trained worker is not aﬀected directly by ﬁring costs20 but gains from
the higher training of old workers. In fact, the only type of ﬁrm that is directly aﬀected
by ﬁring costs is the one employing a young worker. Since for those a fee on layoﬀsi sa n
additional restriction and an additional cost-factor their value is diminished.
It seems plausible that the increase in Jf outweighs the decrease in Jy but additionally
the change in weights (i.e. probabilities) of the value-functions in equation (1) has to be
considered. A higher ﬁring costs implies for instance a lower number of young workers
and workers who got ﬁred.
It turns out that the problem of unemployment cannot be solved analytically and so
we refer to the following section where we show by numerical simulations that a positive
relationship between ﬁring costs and unemployment is the rule.
As already mentioned in the introduction, the possibility to train workers will have
an eﬀect on the costs of ﬁring restrictions. It is plausible that these costs are diminished
since ﬁrm training oﬀers an opportunity to avoid ﬁring costs - at least partially - since the
20I.e. it does not have to pay them in case of a separation and it does not aﬀect the wage it has to pay.
23output of well-trained workers is likely to turn negative. Although the structure of the
model is too complicated to gain analytical insights, we were able to conﬁrm this claim
in the numerical simulations that follow.
246N u m e r i c a l S i m u l a t i o n s
6.1 Calibration
The output of the ﬁrst period is normalized to one, while the output of an old worker
who was retained by the ﬁrm shall be:
vo(g,λ)=1+g + λ (34)
so both human capital and the productivity shock are assumed to be additive. The
shock λ is normally distributed with zero mean. The variance of the shock is our measure
of economic turbulence and is chosen to match certain probabilities of separation (10%,
20% and 30%). The cost of training investments is quadratic to get an inner solution




The calibration of the labor market is very much in line with the recent papers by
Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2005) and Shimer (2005). The matching function used is:
q(θ)=µθ
−γ
where γ is the elasticity of the matching function and µ a parameter describing the
eﬃciency of the labor market.
Using US-data Hall (2005) estimates an elasticity of 0.765 for the matching function
and a market tightness of 0.767 (year 2000). To avoid ineﬃcient unemployment rates I
assume that the Hosios condition is fulﬁlled (see Hosios (1990)) and set the bargaining
power of workers equal to the elasticity of the matching function (i.e. β = γ).





σ2 1.19 Calibrated to get Pstay =0 .8
γ 0.765 Hall (2005)
θ 0.767 Hall (2005)
u 0.08 Assumed
Pfind 0.877 Calibrated to match u
µ 0.937 Calibrated to match θ
sc 0.43 Calibrated to get V =0
I target an unemployment rate of 8% for the economy with a separation rate of 20%
as the baseline. I choose this relatively large unemployment rate since its is assumed
that all workers are born unemployed and in a model of only two periods this is half of
the population. To get lower unemployment rates, very high job-ﬁnding rates would be
necessary and therefore the target of 8% is sort of a compromise. Given a separation rate
of 20% this implies a job-ﬁnding rate of 0.88 which is still higher than the 0.77 that Hall
(2005) ﬁnds. Given the estimated market-tightness of 0.767 and the chosen job-ﬁnding
rate of 0.88, I calibrate 0.937 as the eﬃciency parameter µ of the matching function. This
value is very close to the 0.947 in Hall. Finally, I calibrate the search-cost sc so that the
parameters above fulﬁll the zero-proﬁt condition. The resulting parameters are illustrated
in table (1).
266.2 Results
In this section we show that ﬁring costs increase the level of unemployment but that this
eﬀect is smaller in an economy with better training opportunities. As well, we are able to
show that they do more harm in times of high economic turbulence. Thus we can replicate
the phenomenon that Europe had lower unemployment rates in the 60s but has higher
unemployment since the 80s, while the structure of institutions did not change too much.
As in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2002) it is the degree of economic turbulence
that is crucial for the way ﬁring costs aﬀect unemployment, although this turbulence is
modelled diﬀerently in the present paper: In our model it is the uncertainty about future
worker-productivity whereas in Ljungqvist and Sargent’s papers it is the magnitude of
human-capital a worker looses when she is ﬁred.


























As already mentioned in the section above, we have calibrated the model for a baseline
economy with a separation rate of 20% and no ﬁring costs. In this baseline economy
training raises the output of a worker by approximately 10% and the cost of training
is around 1% of output. We compare our baseline economy with an economy that has
better investment opportunities (tc =0 .5 so that training costs are halved) and with an
economy that does not have any training opportunities at all (i.e. tc = ∞). The ﬁrst
graph (ﬁgure (3)) illustrates the eﬀects of ﬁring costs going from zero to 200% of output
27per (young) worker and shows percentage changes in training. So a ﬁring cost of 1 (100%
of output) increases training by more than 15% in the baseline economy and a little bit
less in the economy with low training costs. It might seem surprising that the eﬀect is
r e l a t i v e l yh i g h e ri nt h eb a s e l i n ee c o n o m y .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c t ,t h a tt h ei m p a c to fﬁring
costs is similar in absolute terms, but since the baseline economy starts out with a lower
level this means bigger changes in relative terms.
The next graphs concentrate on the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on unemployment and on the
way in which this interaction is inﬂuenced by the possibility of ﬁrm training. Figure (4)
shows that an increase in ﬁring costs increases unemployment. This is true for all three
economies although they start out with diﬀerent levels of unemployment (which is clear
since better training opportunities imply better proﬁt opportunities as well). The result is
not sensitive to the choice of economic turbulence although the magnitude of the reaction
is, as will become clear in a minute.21












To be better able to compare the eﬀects of ﬁring costs in the three economies (and
therefore how this eﬀect is inﬂuenced by the possibility of training), ﬁgure (5) compares the
absolute changes in unemployment caused by an increase in ﬁring costs for the economy
21In principle it is possible to construct cases in which ﬁring costs decrease unemployment, but these
cases are rather artiﬁcial (implying for instance extremely low separation rates).
28with high uncertainty.22 It can be seen that the increase in unemployment is largest for
the economy without training opportunities. This is not surprising and the intuition for
this is result is the fact, that training gives ﬁrms a possibility to lower the costs of ﬁring
constraints - the output of better trained workers is less likely to turn negative. However,
the diﬀerences are relatively small and they are so small that the order of lines is reversed
if we look at relative changes as is done in ﬁgure (6). This reversal is due to the fact, that
the economy without training starts out with higher unemployment and therefore similar
absolute changes are smaller in relative terms.












Figure (6) also illustrates that the eﬀect of ﬁring costs is not so small: A ﬁring cost of
100% of per-period output causes unemployment to rise by 30%. This number is much
smaller in more tranquil economies: It is only 8% for the economy with separation rate
0.2 and below 1% for the economy with separation rate 0.1.
A big disadvantage of the graphs presented so far, is the fact that the economies with
diﬀering training opportunities start out with such diﬀerent rates of unemployment. This
makes comparisons rather hard, as the reversal of order in ﬁgures (5) and (6) illustrated.
22We have chosen the economy with high uncertainty since the results are more clear-cut. However,
qualitatively the results are the same for all degrees of turbulence.
29Figure 6: Relative Change in Unemployment
























































30This is the reason why - in a second simulation based on the same calibration as
above - we modiﬁed the numerical models in such a way that all economies with diﬀering
training opportunities start out with the same rate of unemployment.23 Of course in
such an environment a reversal of order between relative and absolute measures is no
longer possible. The result is illustrated in ﬁgure (7) which shows that the increase in
unemployment is considerably smaller in the economies with training opportunities. This
suggests that ﬁring costs are less harmful for economies with a lot of training.
This claim is further supported by ﬁgure (8) which shows the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on
the probability of workers to ﬁnd a job: The better the possibilities to train, the lower the
eﬀect of ﬁring costs on job-ﬁnding rates. Behind these job-ﬁnding rate lies the proﬁtability
of ﬁrms. The higher the proﬁts of a ﬁrm having a worker are, the more ﬁrms will open up
vacancies - this is the zero-proﬁt condition. More open vacancies imply a higher tightness
on the labor market and better chances for workers to ﬁnd a job. This is the channel
through which ﬁring costs negatively aﬀect the unemployment rate: They decrease the
proﬁtability of ﬁrms by constraining them in their decisions. The possibility to train oﬀers
an opportunity to mitigate these constraints and therefore the decline in job-ﬁnding rates
is smaller for economies with lower training costs. For ﬁgure (8) the baseline economy
w i t has e p a r a t i o nr a t eo f2 0 %w a sc h o s e n .H o w e v e r ,t h er e s u l td o e sn o td e p e n da ta l lo n
the speciﬁcation of the model or on the measure (relative or absolute diﬀerences) chosen.
As already discussed above the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on unemployment depends consid-
erably on the degree of economic turbulence. This fact opens up a possible explanation for
the empirical fact mentioned in the introduction: That Europe had lower unemployment
rates than the US during the 60s but higher unemployment for the last two decades. The
story is similar to the one provided by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2002): Rigid
labor market institutions are more of a problem in a world with high economic turbulence.
The higher the uncertainty of future output and the higher the risks of separation, the
23This is done by adding lump-sum transfers to the ﬁr m si ns u c haw a yt h a tt i g h t n e s sa n ds e p a r a t i o n
rates are the same in all models (for zero ﬁring costs).










more harmful restrictions on ﬁring become. To illustrate ﬁgure (9) shows the develop-
ment of two diﬀerent economies. The one economy has no training at all and also no
ﬁring restrictions (F =0 , sc = ∞), whereas the other has considerable ﬁring costs but
good opportunities to train workers (F =1 , sc =0 .5).














During times of low turbulence the economy with training opportunities is better oﬀ.
However, as times become more uncertain, ﬁring restrictions become more harmful and
unemployment is higher in the training-economy. Of course, this tells only part of the
32story: After all, the picture suggests that unemployment decreased in both economies
which is not true. However, it explains one channel through which rigid institutions
might be less harmful at times and more harmful at other times.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Quite often labor market institutions in Europe are made responsible for the relatively
high unemployment rates compared to the US. In this paper we were able to show that
these institutions have positive eﬀects as well, which are usually not considered in public
discussions. Firing costs imply that ﬁrms and workers are bound together more closely. In
times when proﬁts are low (or even negative) ﬁrms will be more reluctant to ﬁre workers in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁring costs. This is anticipated by ﬁrms. They know that the probability
of separations is lowered and therefore they provide more training to workers. Since ﬁrms
typically provide ineﬃciently low training (see for instance Acemoglu (1997)), there might
be a potential for welfare-improvements.
Of course, the negative eﬀects of ﬁring costs from the ﬁrms perspective cannot be
denied: The separation decision becomes ineﬃcient and ﬁring costs improve the bargaining
position of insiders. However, the last result is anticipated by ﬁrm’s and young workers
and therefore reﬂected in wage negotiations at the beginning of a match. Young workers
are willing to accept lower wages in return for higher wages in the future. Thus, this
eﬀect of ﬁring costs can be mitigated and will have no negative eﬀects on the employment
decision of ﬁrms. However, the problem that ﬁring costs lead to ineﬃcient separations
cannot be avoided. Separations are ineﬃcient because worker and ﬁrm stick together
even in cases when it would be more eﬃcient to look for new partners. Of course, this
ineﬃciency reduces the proﬁtability of ﬁrms which is reﬂected in the employment decision
of ﬁrms: Fewer vacancies are posted. This clearly tends to increase the unemployment
rate.
Nevertheless, the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on unemployment is not unambiguous. Due to
33the lower risk of separations, not only the outﬂo wo u to fu n e m p l o y m e n ti sd e c r e a s e db u t
also the inﬂow into unemployment. Analytically, it is not clear which of the two eﬀects
dominates. However, numerical simulations suggest that unemployment is more likely
to increase with ﬁring costs. What’s important for the result is the degree of economic
turbulence measured by the variance of the worker’s output. The higher this variation is,
the more harm a further increase in ﬁring costs will do to unemployment. This is in line
with the results of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998 and 2002) who argue that the increase
in economic turbulence is the main reason for the bad employment performance of many
European countries since the 1980s.
There is a second channel through which the possibility of ﬁrm training lowers the
negative eﬀects of ﬁring costs: They decrease the negative eﬀect of ﬁring restrictions
on unemployment because training oﬀers an opportunity to avoid these restrictions at
least partially. The output of a well-trained worker is less likely to turn negative and
therefore it becomes less likely that the ﬁring costs have to be paid. This positive eﬀect
of training is also dependent on the degree of economic turbulence. If uncertainty is high,
the possibility to train becomes less important.
Our trade-oﬀ between unemployment and productivity is closely related to the trade-
oﬀ between training and turnover discussed in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). In their
paper wage compression is explained by asymmetric information. Depending on parameter
values multiple equilibria are possible: One with high training and low turnover and one
with low training and high turnover. It is not clear which of the two equilibria is more
eﬃcient because the one with lower turnover suﬀers from a lower quality of matches.
This quality of matches is an alternative interpretation of our ineﬃcient separations. In
both cases the match is continued although output is very low. Thus, the equilibria
with diﬀerent values of ﬁring costs can be interpreted in a similar way as the multiple
equilibria in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), although in our model multiple equilibria are
not possible.
It might be interesting to put our model into a more realistic framework with more
34periods or a setup where second period wages are aﬀected by conditions on the labor
market. It does not seem very plausible that the bargaining position of an old worker
does not depend at all on the tightness of the labor market. If this were modiﬁed, training
would no longer be independent of market tightness. As shown in chapter three of this
dissertation, an increase in tightness tends to decrease the degree of wage compression
thus depressing ﬁrm training. In the present model, this would mean that the eﬀects of
ﬁring costs are even more positive since market tightness is unambiguously decreasing in
the magnitude of ﬁring costs.
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